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An mid-February, President Clinton will
outline his administration's first, and
much anticipated, economic plan. Al-
though the exact nature of the package is
still speculative as of this writing, it is
clear that any short-run stimulus will be
accompanied by long-run deficit reduc-
tion measures. For this, the administra-
tion is being praised in advance, not the
least by financial markets, which have
responded with a nearly 40-basis-point
decline in long rates since the election.
But whether the markets — and by in-
ference the American public — stay on
board depends on the administration's
ability to follow through with a clear and
credible long-term plan to accomplish
the deficit reduction it and the new Con-
gress clearly desire.
At the outset of what will surely be
extended and heated debate about the
details of the Clinton proposals, it is
essential to recognize that the deficit is
no longer the controlling element of
the budget process. Since passage of
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
(BEA), the primary discipline exerted
by budgetary rules emanates not from
deficit targets but from legislative limits
on certain classes of expenditure. This
shift was intentional and fundamental,
reflecting as it did the weaknesses in-
herent in the original Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH) deficit reduction
mechanism as a tool for managing the
federal budget.
The fact that BEA effectively makes ex-
penditure targets the constraining ele-
ments of the current fiscal environment
is one reason for increasing the public's
awareness of the Act's provisions as
well as its history. But this is not the
only reason. Because BEA was largely
a response to the failure of the original
GRH process, a clear and careful exam-
ination of its provisions would help to
clarify the rationale for the de facto
abandonment of deficit targeting and
would concentrate debate on the task
of developing an effective and efficient
budget process.
The goal of this Economic Commentary
is to contribute to that discussion. The first
step is to briefly review the broad history
of fiscal policy from the inception of GRH
through its evolution in BEA. The essen-
tial point is that GRH, as first constructed,
was fundamentally flawed for two reasons.
First, because objectives were stated in
terms of deficits rather than more basic ex-
penditure and revenue targets, GRH was
inadequate in focusing debate on specific
spending and taxation programs. Second,
and more important, GRH was a "let by-
gones be bygones" policy in that it pro-
vided no ex post enforcement mechanism
for addressing inevitable failures to meet
prescribed targets.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
(BEA) was a significant improvement
in the federal budget process because
it replaced deficit targets that were es-
sentially unenforceable with explicit
spending targets that are, in principle,
binding after the fact. This article con-
tends that the deficit reduction efforts of
the new administration and Congress
would be greatly aided by extending
BEA through 1996, maintaining distinc-
tions among different categories of dis-
cretionary spending, and introducing
caps on mandatory expenditures.
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The remainder of this article is devoted to
examining the degree to which flaws in
the GRH legislation were addressed by
BEA. I argue that, by superseding essen-
tially nonbinding deficit commitments
with spending limits that are enforceable
after the fact, BEA is a vast improvement
in the process that governs federal budget
policy. However, it does not go far
enough. By failing to extend spending
caps to mandatory expenditures such as
Medicare and Social Security, the Act
leaves an important part of the job un-
done. Furthermore, because the distinc-
tions among different classes of discre-
tionary spending are removed beginning
in fiscal year (FY) 1994 and the legisla-
tion expires in 1996, BEA will become
extinct before it can truly be tested.'
• The Beginning and End
of GRH as We Knew It
By 1985, the U.S. economy was well
into the longest peacetime expansion
on record, and the two-headed dragon
of high unemployment and excessive
inflation had been, if not slain, at least
seriously wounded. In this environ-
ment, public attention began to focus
on the new bad news in town — large
and increasing federal deficits.
To the rescue came the GRH deficit re-
duction plan, more formally known as
the Balanced Budget Act of 1985. The
essence of GRH was a series of ever-
smaller deficit targets, a baby-steps pro-
gram to tame the newly developed
federal deficit addiction. But in fact,
GRH never required that the legislated
targets actually be met, only that the
deficits implied by congressional
budget resolutions meet the mandated
targets. If actual deficits exceeded the
targets after the fact, so be it.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that
realized deficits exceeded the GRH tar-
gets in every year from FY1986
through FY1990, even after the targets
were adjusted upward in 1987. Indeed,
as illustrated in figure 1, one clear
effect of the process was to weaken
substantially the close relationship be-
tween actual and projected deficits that
had existed in the years prior to imple-
mentation of GRH.
Still, it would be inaccurate to claim that
GRH had no influence on the fiscal policy
process. Nominal deficits either fell or
barely rose in every year from 1986 to
1989. Because the economy was expand-
ing in each of these years, deficits actual-
ly dropped as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product (GDP). Although the
original GRH deficit schedule was
amended in 1987 after having been in
effect for only two years, with the tar-
get date for a balanced budget set back
from FY1991 to FY1993, this modest
progress allowed many to cling to the
illusion that the GRH process was in
good working order and would even-
tually, if belatedly, reduce the deficit to
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zero.
In 1990, growth in the deficit accelerated
and GRH finally became untenable as a
deficit containment framework. Even in
the best of circumstances, it would likely
have been necessary to alter the deficit
reduction time schedule, as had been done
three years earlier. But circumstances
were anything but the best. In the year of
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the onset of
the recession, and an early installment of
what would be a long string of payments
for savings and loan failures, such tinker-
ing was no longer a viable option.KEY ELEMENTS OF BEA
Deficit and Spending Targets
• Set maximum deficit ceilings and discretionary caps for FY1991-95
• Mandated separate caps for domestic, defense, and international spending in FY1991-93
Sequester Provisions
• Introduced three-step sequester process, pertaining to discretionary spending, entitlement spending, and deficits
• Provided for "look-back" sequester in the event of legislation that violated discretionary spending caps subsequent to original
budget agreements
• Mandated "pay-as-you-go" conditions for most mandatory spending programs requiring that tax or benefit changes not add to the
deficit
• Effectively eliminated the probability that the sequester mechanism would be triggered by violation of deficit targets
Adjustment Clauses
• Provided for the adjustment of spending and deficit limits based on changes in economic and technical conditions
• Excluded Social Security and deposit insurance transactions from deficit calculations used in sequester decisions
• Allowed enforcement provisions to be suspended in the event of war or recession
• Permitted spending caps and deficit ceilings to be relaxed through "emergency" appropriations
Essentially, the inherent flaws in the
GRH process had finally and irrevers-
ibly manifested themselves. In making
deficits the centerpiece of the policy de-
bate, fundamental issues about fiscal
priorities were allowed to go unre-
solved. Should deficits be slashed pri-
marily by spending reductions? By tax
increases? By some combination of the
two? In the context of an administra-
tion and Congress with different agen-
das and biases, the failure to defini-
tively address these issues virtually
promised what was delivered: continu-
ing divisiveness, untimely and ad hoc
decisionmaking, and plenty of fudging
of the numbers and the process.
Further, without an ex post enforcement
mechanism, GRH effectively had no
teeth, forcing neither the executive
branch nor the legislature to confront
the underlying pressures that built with
each target miss. Although the events
that led to the run of record-setting
deficits beginning in FY1990 were to a
large extent unanticipated, policymak-
ers, having conveniently let slide their
past GRH transgressions, were ill posi-
tioned to assert that these extraordinary
events were merely temporary setbacks
on the road to fiscal responsibility.
• The Birth of BEA
The final breakdown of GRH resulted,
after considerable haggling between
the Congress and President Bush, in
the BEA, part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990. Some of
BEA's key elements are summarized in
the box above.
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Although technically an extension of
GRH, BEA goes far beyond the adjust-
ments that were made to GRH in 1987.
The most important innovation was shift-
ing the focus of the process toward expen-
diture policy, a change manifested in the
revision of GRH's sequester, or automatic
expenditure reduction, procedures.
BEA introduced into GRH two new se-
quester triggers, one applying to discre-
tionary expenditures and one applying
to entitlement expenditures. The pro-
visions associated with the former have
two important features. First, through
the current fiscal year, separate spend-
ing caps pertain to three distinct cate-
gories of discretionary spending:
domestic, defense, and international.
The legislation does not allow for sur-
pluses in one category to be shifted
into another in order to avoid the se-
quester trigger. For example, reductions
in the defense budget cannot be used to
finance domestic spending in excess of
the legislated limit.
Second, discretionary spending caps can,
to some extent, be enforced after the fact.
In particular, although the FY1993 bud-
get was passed without triggering the
BEA sequester mechanism, any legisla-
tion passed by the new Congress that
causes outlays to exceed the caps in the
current fiscal year would, without spe-
cific legislation enabling "emergency"
appropriation, trigger a sequestration.
Also, unlike the original GRH bill,
BEA introduced "pay-as-you-go"
(PAYGO) requirements on direct, or
mandatory, federal programs, which in-
clude entitlement expenditures. The
PAYGO conditions require that new
legislation involving mandatory out-
lays not contribute to the deficit at the
margin. Any new entitlement commit-
ments, for example, would trigger auto-
matic spending cuts unless offset by
revenue increases or matching spend-
ing reductions in other programs, as
would legislation reducing revenues
from existing programs.TABLE 1 PROJECTED DISCRETIONARY





















SOURCES: Outlay caps, deficit caps, and FY1993 outlay projections are taken from the Office of Management
and Budget's Final Sequestration Report to the President and Congress, issued in October 1992. Outlay projections
for FY 1994 and FY 1995 are baseline estimates from the Bush administration's January 1993 budget report.
Although BEA maintained the original
sequester procedures associated with
deficits themselves, these procedures are
no longer effective. In theory, expendi-
ture reductions can be triggered if the
budgeted deficit exceeds its target in a
given fiscal year after automatic cuts
from the other two sequester mechanisms
have been exhausted. In practice, proce-
dures for adjusting the deficit targets in
FY1992 and FY1993 rendered the GRH
sequestration mechanism moot. The
recent decision by President Clinton to
retain these adjustment procedures for the
duration of BEA guarantees that maxi-
mum deficit caps will continue to be
irrelevant as a potential trigger to auto-
matic spending cuts.
• Does BEA Matter?
BEA's expenditure caps, however, are
not irrelevant, as indicated in table 1.
Under current programs — that is,
abstracting from any of the expanded
spending plans endorsed by President
Clinton during the campaign — all
three categories of discretionary spend-
ing are at or near their limits for the cur-
rent fiscal year. Thus, it is highly un-
likely that any significant federal
spending intiatives during the balance
of FY 1993 are feasible within the boun-
daries set by this year's expenditure
caps. In other words, unless altered by
vote of Congress, BEA's discretionary
spending limits are an immediate con-
straint on the expenditure options avail-
able to the federal government.
Such alterations of the BEA targets are,
of course, possible. In addition to ad-
justments associated with changing
economic and technical conditions, the
spending and deficit caps that could
trigger sequestration can be rescinded
in the event of war, poor economic per-
formance (for example, GDP growth
below a 1 percent annual rate for two
consecutive quarters), or specific appro-
priation of emergency expenditures.
Although neither the war nor the low-
growth escape clause was invoked dur-
ing the first three fiscal years that BEA
was in force, emergency appropriations
were passed for FY1992.
8 Nonetheless,
expenditure totals remained close to
the required caps.
This flexibility might be viewed as a
loophole engineered to allow the legisla-
tion to be largely ignored, as GRH had
been prior to 1990. Undoubtedly this as-
sessment is to some degree true, but it is
equally true that the 1985 GRH process
was a failure in part because it was not
flexible enough. For example, the setting
of nominal targets independent of the in-
flation rate or real targets independent of
economic growth makes little sense. If
done credibly, adjusting deficit and ex-
penditure caps in light of changing eco-
nomic circumstances that are largely inde-
pendent of the budget process guarantees
that fiscal goals will be defined in terms
that are economically meaningful.
More problematic is the fact that BEA
was not extensive enough in its cover-
age. This applies both to the categories
of spending to which limits were ap-
plied and to the time horizon over
which the legislation is effective. The
obvious omission of expenditure caps
on entitlement spending guaranteed
that BEA would not result in substantial
reductions in the deficit. As shown in
figure 2, the intransigence of the deficit
in recent years is largely attributable to
the fact that entitlement expenditures
have outpaced revenues collected to
finance them: If contributions to social
insurance funds had equaled spending
on health, Medicare, Income Security,
and Social Security in FY1992, the
federal budget would have been nearly
in balance.
But even the more modest goals of
restraining discretionary outlays will
disappear unless the new administra-
tion and Congress act to extend BEA.
As of FY 1994, the "budget walls" that
placed separate limits on the individual
categories of discretionary spending in
FY1991-93 will be gone. This is a
decided step backward. During the
budget discussions for FY1993, there
was a significant movement to tear
down the existing walls and to use "ex-
cess" funds from the defense budget to
increase domestic expenditures. Be-
cause of the BEA rules, however, this
movement was successfully repelled,
and total appropriations almost surely
ended up lower than they would other-
wise have been.
More important, requiring limits on in-
dividual categories of expenditure forces
the President and Congress to set and
articulate specific multiyear spending
priorities; that is, to think of budget policy
as a collection of actions aimed at spe-
cific ends rather than as an amorphous
money pie to be divvied up until gone.
Given the uncertain nature of the world,
it may indeed be sensible to revisit these
priorities periodically. But this argues for
the construction of new walls as the old
ones come down, not an abandonment of
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Worse yet, BEA is set to expire in two
years. Whatever the rationale for this
timetable in 1990, there is little to
recommend it now. At a time when pol-
icymakers' task is to implement coher-
ent and consistent fiscal objectives, it
would be extremely unfortunate to
eliminate, without alternative, the only
vestige of legislative discipline that ex-
ists, imperfect as it might be.
• Four More Years
It has become popular to speak cynical-
ly of the GRH legislation as a thin veil
of respectability behind which the usual
budget chicanery and fiscal irresponsi-
bility were allowed to continue apace.
This characterization goes too far. GRH
was fundamentally flawed, but that is
not the same thing as irrelevant. There
is little doubt that BEA owes its exis-
tence to GRH, for it was forged when
Congress and the Bush administration
were struggling with the contradiction
between feasible policy choices and
legislated deficit promises.
BEA may have come at a high price —
after all, former President Bush bought
the plan at the expense of his "no new
taxes" pledge — but the fiscal policy
process was well served. The budget
principles implemented by the Act
were sound, specifying clearly stated
spending objectives with explicitly
articulated rules for seeing that those
objectives were met. Nevertheless, as
most observers (including many in the
new administration) have concluded,
restoring order to U.S. fiscal policy will
require restraining mandatory, as well
as discretionary, spending. Further-
more, permanent progress will almost
certainly require systemic change — an
alteration of the process and rules gov-
erning these particular expenditure
decisions. The logical starting point is
extension of the BEA process to man-
datory spending categories.
That the decisions required in setting caps
on mandatory spending will be unpopu-
lar in some circles is more than an under-
statement, and it is probably unrealistic to
insist that such potentially divisive issues
be addressed once and for all in President
Clinton's first budget. However, there is
much to recommend that BEA be pre-
served, at least over the term of the new
administration, and that the practice of
legislating separate spending limits on
discretionary appropriations be
reinstated.
Congress and the President have indi-
cated a strong desire to tame the fed-
eral budget beast. Their task will be
complicated if, as appears likely, Presi-
dent Clinton's first economic proposals
include stimulative short-run spending
plans that violate the BEA spending caps.
Reasonable people can disagree about
the need for such a policy in the current
environment, but coupling short-run
strategy with serious long-run fiscal re-
form would almost certainly soften the
concerns of deficit reduction advocates.
Extending BEA through FY1996 in the
form that has governed the budget
process through the current fiscal year
would be an excellent place to start.• Footnotes
1. Fiscal years run from October of the pre-
ceding calendar year through the following
September.
2. Modifications were made to GRH prior
to the 1987 amendments, largely in response
to constitutional challenges to the bill's orig-
inal sequester provisions. The deficit targets
were unaffected by these changes, however.
3. A comprehensive—and comprehensible
—review of the details of GRH and BEAcan
be found in Part 3, Section 3 of the 1992
Greenbook, Committee on Ways and Means
of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
4. Sequester provisions mandate the im-
plementation, by presidential order, of auto-
matic spending cuts based on prespecified
formulas that identify the expenditure cate-
gories affected.
5. Depending on the timing of the offending
outlays, the sequester order could take the
form of offsetting spending cuts in the cur-
rent fiscal year or a compensating reduction
in the spending cap applied to the budget for
the subsequent fiscal year.
6. The PAYGO requirements do not apply to
Social Security or to deposit insurance commit-
ments that existed when BEA was passed.
However, separate legislation was enacted with
respect to Social Security in order to maintain
actuarial balance in the trust funds in the event
of benefit or tax changes.
7. The spending caps reported in table 1 are
taken from the Office of Management and
Budget's "Final Sequestration Report to the
Congress and the President for Fiscal Year
1993," submitted October 23, 1992.
8. Expenditures associated with Operation
Desert Storm were explicitly accounted for
in the initial legislation.
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